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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 Appellant, Rebecca E. Bender ("Bender"), an attorney who represented the 
defendants, Harold E. Brown, Kyle Energy, Inc. and Kyle Energy and Kyle Energy 
Corporation,0 in this action, appeals orders of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania sanctioning her for refusing to comply with a discovery 
order and for refiling two motions the court reserved for trial after denying them without 
prejudice.0 The discovery sanctions required Bender and Brown to pay $500 each plus the 
costs plaintiff Leon M. Martin ("Martin") incurred in connection with the discovery 
request.  Bender's and Brown's liability for these costs was joint and several.  The 
sanction for refiling the two motions required Bender individually to pay an additional 
$500.  In an accompanying memorandum, the district court stated that it was imposing these 
sanctions under Rule 11, Rule 37, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 (West 1994) and the court's inherent 
power. 
 Brown shortly thereafter filed for bankruptcy in the Middle District of Florida 
Bankruptcy Court.  Martin's case against Brown was stayed under the automatic stay of 
Bankruptcy Code § 362, 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West Supp. 1995), and the district court entered 
an order dismissing Martin's case against Brown without prejudice.  Bender does not 
represent Brown in the bankruptcy, which is still pending. 
                     
0Bender represented all three defendants.  For the sake of simplicity, however, we will 
refer solely to Brown. 
0The orders Bender appeals are dated April 20 and April 25, 1994.  They impose the same 
sanctions.  The April 20 order, however, did not include the docket numbers of ten 
limine motions.  See Martin v. Brown, No. 86-1239, slip op. at 1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. April
1994). 
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 Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that we have appellate 
jurisdiction over Bender's appeal despite the fact that the district court dismissed the 
underlying action "without prejudice."  Appellant's Appendix ("App.") at 664.  We also 
hold that the manner in which the district court judge imposed these sanctions deprived 
Bender of the essentials of procedural due process, viz, fair notice and an opportunity to 
be heard. Because of our disposition of this appeal on procedural grounds, it is 
unnecessary for us to decide the propriety of the sanctions imposed on Bender.  We will 
therefore vacate the district court's orders imposing sanctions on Bender and remand the 
case to it for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
II.  Statement of the Case and Facts 
 In November 1992, Brown retained Bender as defense counsel in an ongoing case in 
which Martin claimed Brown violated federal securities laws, the Racketeering Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"),0 and engaged in state common law fraud and breach 
of contract by selling or offering to sell interests in numerous gas well properties.
 On December 30, 1992, the district court issued an order disposing of several of 
Martin's discovery motions.  The order included a provision granting Martin permission to 
inspect certain real property Brown owned.  This part stated, "[t]he defendants shall make 
arrangements with plaintiff for inspection [of the real property] on or before February
1993."  App. at 106.  The real estate covered included Brown's personal residence and 
laundromat he owned.  Bender refused to permit inspection of the real property because she 
believed it was irrelevant to any liability Brown might have to Martin or any damages he 
might owe after the RICO claim had been dismissed. 
 On January 22, 1993, Martin's counsel sent a telex to Bender informing her of 
Martin's continuing insistence on inspecting these properties.  Bender responded the next 
                     
0The district court dismissed the RICO count on October 23, 1990, before Bender's 
association with the case. 
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day by denying the request for inspection and reiterating her contention that inspections 
of the real property had no relevance to any of Martin's surviving claims.  Then, in 
February 1993, Bender sent a letter to Martin's attorney asking him to clarify or justify 
the inspection of these properties. 
 In March 1993, Bender filed ten in limine motions. They were unrelated to the 
discovery dispute.  She also filed a motion to dismiss the federal security claim arguing 
that the interests in gas wells Martin claimed Brown fraudulently offered for sale were 
not securities as defined by federal law. Alternatively, Bender moved to certify this 
issue for immediate appeal believing an interlocutory determination could expeditiously 
dispose of Martin's only remaining federal claim. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 1993).  
This was the third time Brown had raised the lack-of-a-security question.0  One of the ten 
in limine motions Bender had filed was yet a fourth attempt to relitigate the security 
issue.  In another of Bender's ten in limine motions, she also raised for the second time 
the statute of limitations as a defense.0 
 On March 31, 1993, with the dispute over inspection of Brown's real estate 
unresolved, Martin filed a Rule 37 motion to sanction Brown for her refusal to comply with 
the December 30, 1992 order.  In April 1993, Bender filed a response and Martin thereafter 
filed a reply.  In an order entered April 30, 1993, the district court decided to keep 
Martin's Rule 37 motion for sanctions under advisement, "subject to the parties' and 
attorneys' compliance with discovery directives set forth" in the memorandum support
its order.  App. at 593.  The memorandum criticized both parties for their conduct in 
discovery, warned them that sanctions would be imposed for future noncompliance with the 
letter or spirit of the discovery rules and cautioned them about the use of "
                     
0The issue was first decided in October 1990 and then again in December 1992, both times 
without prejudice. 
0The issue was also first decided in October 1990. 
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verbiage," "superfluous language" and the filing of unwarranted motions and excessively 
long papers.  App. at 587. 
 Also on April 30, 1993, the district court denied Bender's motion to dismiss on 
the security issue and refused to certify it for interlocutory appeal.  Concurrently, it 
also rejected Bender's in limine motion concerning the security issue, reasoning that it 
was "in part a disguised motion to relitigate the 'securities' issue," App. at 588, and 
once more denied the statute of limitations issue as repetitive, but again without 
prejudice to Brown's right to raise it at trial.  The court warned, however:  "Counsel is 
instructed not to make any further attempts to relitigate this issue prior to trial on the 
merits." App. at 589. 
 After the April 30, 1993 order, counsel on each side seemed to have made an 
effort to resolve the outstanding discovery issues.  Sometime around July 1993, Martin's 
original counsel, Thomas E. Rodgers ("Rodgers"), was hospitalized. Thereafter Martin was 
represented by a lawyer named David H. Cullis ("Cullis").  Bender contends that Cullis's 
unfamiliarity with her discussions with Rodgers revived the inspection problem.
 In January 1994, the district court dismissed without prejudice Bender's 
remaining in limine motions and Martin's motion for sanctions.  With the resurfacing of 
the dispute concerning inspection of Brown's real estate, the district court once more 
directed the parties to negotiate outstanding matters and to resubmit formal motions, on 
or before April 1, 1994, for judicial resolution of any pre-trial matters then in dispute. 
The district court instructed counsel to append to any such motions a certification that 
they had tried, in good faith, to resolve their dispute. 
                     
0Bender argues that a number of problems in this case resulted from the entry of new 
counsel.  The record, however, suggests that Cullis may have had some previous 
relationship to the case or to prior counsel.  The record shows the following: Rodgers's 
letterhead indicates that he was a sole practitioner. Cullis practiced in a firm named 
Rodgers and Cullis, P.C. Rodgers and Cullis, P.C.'s letterhead lists two partners: 
Patricia A. Rodgers and Cullis.  Rodgers and Rodgers & Cullis, P.C. have the same address, 
phone and facsimile number listed on their respective letterheads.  Furthermore, Cullis 
responded to correspondence sent to Rodgers before his illness forced him out of the case.
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 On March 16, 1994, Bender sent a letter directly to the judge presiding over the 
case.  In it, she enclosed all ten of the in limine motions she had presented in 
March 1993, including for the fifth time the securities issue and, also, the statute of 
limitations defense that the district court, in its April 30, 1993 order, explicitly 
directed her not to resubmit until trial. Martin also refiled several of his motions, 
including the Rule 37 motion for sanctions for Brown's failure to afford inspection of his 
real estate. 
 On April 8, 1994, the district court entered another order.  It again directed 
the parties to meet in an effort to resolve Martin's outstanding discovery requests and 
Brown's ten in limine motions.  The court also noted that Bender had failed to file with 
the clerk the motions forwarded with her March 16, 1994 letter.  The order scheduled an 
April 15, 1994 hearing for unresolved matters.  In its April 8, 1994 order, the district 
court echoed its warning to the parties and their counsel that sanctions could be imposed 
for conduct that "is in violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Rules of 
Professional Conduct."  App. at 647. 
 Bender did not appear personally at the April 15 hearing.  She had yet to refile 
her in limine motions with the clerk of the district court, but Brown's local counsel was 
present and tried to argue their merits.  The district court questioned him pointedly 
about Bender's persistent refiling of motions denied without prejudice pending trial, as 
well as her refusal to permit inspection of all the real estate included in the court's 
December 30, 1992 order.  It ordered Bender, on or before April 20, 1994, to file with the 
clerk the motions that she previously mailed to the judge with her March 16, 1994 letter 
before it would consider them.  On April 20, 1994, Bender again filed all ten 
motions.0  On that day the district court entered its initial April 20, 1994 order 
                     
0Bender claims that she only filed these ten in limine motions because the district court 
ordered her to do so.  Thus, she contends that any sanctions imposed upon her are unfair.  
We need not decide this issue because of our resolution of this case on procedural 
grounds.  We note, however, that when the district court directed Bender to file with the 
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imposing sanctions on Bender and Brown and, on April 25, revised the April 
adding the docket numbers of the in limine motions. 
 Bender appeals from those portions of both orders sanctioning her for "willful 
and flagrant" disregard of the court's orders by "resurrecting and advocating defendants' 
motions in limine regarding 'lack of a security' and the 'statute of limitations 
defense'"; App. at 654-55, and "for refusal to permit meaningful inspection of real 
property in compliance with [the] court's orders . . . ."  Id. at 652-53.  For her 
persistence in raising questions the district court had decided, or indicate
defer to trial, the court ordered Bender to pay $500 personally.  For prohibiting Martin 
from inspecting certain properties, the court ordered Bender and Brown each to pay $500 
and, jointly and severally, any costs Martin had incurred in attempting to arrange an 
inspection. 
 
III.  Jurisdiction 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying dispute 
between Martin and Brown under 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq. (West Supp. 1995) and 28 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1341 and 1343 (West 1993).  Bender contends that the district court's orders of 
April 20 and 25, 1994 are "final decisions" over which we have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). Although no appellee is present to refute her 
contention,0 we have a threshold obligation to consider our appellate jurisdiction.  
e.g., Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pa., 639 F.2d 972, 978 (3d Cir. 1981). 
                                                                  
clerk the ten in limine motions she had enclosed in her March 16, 1994 letter to the 
judge, it only ordered Bender to comply with its rules of procedure. 
0Appeals of attorney sanctions often present this procedural problem because there is no 
appellee.  See Snow Machines, Inc. v. Hedco, Inc., 838 F.2d 718, 725 (3d Cir. 1988).  
Thus, "[w]e must play not only our accustomed and proper role of neutral adjudicator, but 
also (albeit temporarily) the role of adversary to the appellant in order to test the 
assertions made on appeal." Id. at 726.  In limited situations, we have appointed 
achieve the benefits of the adversarial system.  See Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc.
F.2d 557, 559 n.1 (3d Cir. 1985).  We believe that action is unnecessary in this case.
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A.  Strict Finality 
 Our appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to the review of final decisions 
of the district courts.  United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1010 (3d Cir. 1993); 
also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291.0  Section 1291 states:  "The courts of appeals . . 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United 
States . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."  28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1291.  "A final decision is one which disposes of the whole subject, gives all the 
relief that was contemplated, provides with reasonable completeness, for giving effect to 
the judgment and leaves nothing to be done in the cause save to superintend, 
ministerially, the execution of the decree."  Isidor Paiewonsky Associates, Inc. v. Sharp 
Properties, Inc., 998 F.2d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal brackets, quotation, emphasis 
and citations omitted). 
 The district court's order dismissing the litigation underlying Bender's 
sanctions states: 
IT IS ORDERED the action is dismissed without prejudice and the Clerk 
shall mark the case closed.  The Court retains complete jurisdiction 
to vacate this Order and to reopen the action upon cause shown that 
the stay has been lifted or further litigation is necessary. 
 
 
App. at 664.  In Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam), we held that "[g]enerally, an order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice 
is neither final nor appealable because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff 
without affecting the cause of action."  In that case, and in subsequent cases, we 
recognized that exceptions exist, e.g., when the party "cannot amend or declares his 
intention to stand on his complaint."  Id. at 952.  The dispositive inquiry is whether the 
district court's order finally resolved the case. See, e.g., Presbytery of N.J. of 
                     
0Although section 1292 authorizes appeals of certain specified non-final orders, none are 
applicable here.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1292 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994). 
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Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1461 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1994); 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison, N.J., 907 F.2d 1408, 1416-17 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 In Trent v. Dial Medical of Florida, Inc., 33 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1994), we 
addressed the effect on our appellate jurisdiction of a district court's stay and 
dismissal pursuant to Colorado River abstention.0  We stated that "[e]ven dismissals 
without prejudice have been held to be final and appealable if they end the suit so far as 
the District Court was concerned, although . . . such dismissals may not constitute final 
orders until the party seeking relief renounces any intention to reinstate litigation."  
Id. at 220 (internal quotation, citation and brackets omitted).  In reliance on 
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), we held that the inquiry 
was whether the purpose and effect of the stay order was to surrender jurisdiction of the 
federal suit to a state court.  Id. at 221 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n.11).
 Bender argues similarly that the district court's dismissal effectively ended 
this case.  Her client, Brown, is in bankruptcy and she no longer represents him.  While 
Martin may assert his claims against Brown in the bankruptcy court, he is precluded from 
recommencing them in the district court while the bankruptcy is pending.  Martin will also 
be foreclosed from subsequently asserting his claims unless the bankruptcy court denies 
Brown a discharge.  Accepting Bender's argument, however, would require us to hold that 
the invocation of the bankruptcy code's automatic stay would always result in a final 
disposition triggering appellate review.  That result would be inconsistent with the 
rationale behind the automatic stay provision.  See, e.g., Raymark Industries v. Lai
F.2d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1992) (automatic stay provides "a breathing spell for the debtor 
which stops all collection efforts") (internal quote omitted). Furthermore, in 
U.S. Capital Corp., 990 F.2d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 1993), we held that a dismissal without 
prejudice based on the defendants' bankruptcy filing was not final because the parties 
                     
0See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
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were "free to seek relief from the automatic stay and pursue their claims against those 
defendants," and because the case had "the potential to lead to piecemeal appeals."  
Although this case is dormant, if not dead, with regard to Martin's claims against Brown, 
our analysis under section 1291's strict finality rule requires us to look at the entire 
case, including Bender's conduct in allegedly not complying with the district court's 
orders.  Thus, we are unable to say the district court's dismissal without prejudice has 
finally determined the entire case and, therefore, we conclude that our jurisdiction must 
be based on the collateral order doctrine. 
 
B.  The Collateral Order Doctrine 
 The collateral order doctrine, as first annunciated in Cohen v. Beneficial 
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), relaxes the strict standard of finality by 
permitting us to entertain appeals from certain orders that would not otherwise be 
appealable final decisions.  See Johnson v. Jones, No. 94-455, 1995 WL 347244, at *4 (U.S. 
June 12, 1995) ("[I]n [Cohen], this Court held that certain so-called collateral orders 
amount to 'final decisions,' immediately appealable under . . . 28 U.S.C. §
though the district court may have entered those orders before (perhaps long before) the 
case has ended."); Bertoli, 994 F.2d at 1010 ("The flexibility given by Cohen
permits appeal of some district court orders that do not terminate the entire case, or 
even a discrete part of it.").  The collateral order doctrine recognizes that the benefits 
achieved by the final decision rule can sometimes be outweighed by other concerns.  
Johnson, 1995 WL 347244, at *3 ("sometimes interlocutory appellate review has importa
countervailing benefits").  The case law on the collateral order doctrine is extensive and 
its requirements clear.  It permits appellate review of orders that:  (1) finally resolve 
a disputed question; (2) raise an important issue distinct from the merits of the case; 
and (3) are effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.  See, 
Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1992, 1995-96 (1994); Praxis 
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Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 947 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 1991).  In 
Properties, we described these three requirements as:  (1) the "conclusiveness" prong; (2) 
the "importance/separateness" prong; and (3) the "unreviewablity" prong.  Praxis 
Properties, 947 F.2d at 54-58.  Failure to meet any one prong precludes a finding of 
appellate jurisdiction.  Bertoli, 994 F.2d at 1012. 
 
1.  The "Conclusiveness" Prong 
 "The requirement that the district court's order 'conclusively determine' the 
question means that appellate review is likely needed to avoid that harm."  
WL 347244, at *4.  An order "is conclusive when no further consideration is contemplated 
by the district court."  Bertoli, 994 F.2d at 1011 (citations omitted).  The 
conclusiveness prong excludes from review "'any decision which is tentative, informal or 
incomplete.'"  Swint v. Chambers County Com'n, 115 S. Ct. 1203, 1208 (1995) (quoting 
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, and citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978).
 In Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 537 (3d Cir. 1985), 
we addressed the applicability of the collateral order doctrine to appeals of attorney 
sanctions.  We concluded that there could be "no dispute" that the conclusiveness prong 
was satisfied because "[t]he sanctions order challenged . . . finally and conclusively 
determines the sanctions issue."  Eavenson, 775 F.2d at 538.  Similarly, in 
Distributors, Inc. v. Maico-Fahrzeugfabrik, 658 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1981), although we 
ultimately found the Rule 37 sanctions there involved were not immediately appealable, we 
noted that the sanction order conclusively determined the disputed question of sanctions 
and thus satisfied the first element.  Eastern Maico, 658 F.2d at 947; see 
Lawrence R. Kemm, Note, Interlocutory Appeals of Attorney Sanctions: In Search of a 
Standard, 25 Ind. L. Rev. 919, 923 (1991) ("[T]here has been little discussion or 
disagreement that a sanction order represents a 'conclusive determination.'") (collecting 
cases). 
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 We have no trouble concluding on the record before us that the district court's 
orders sanctioning Bender were its final word on her liability for professional 
misconduct.  There is no indication that the court intended to revisit the issue and two 
of the sanctions were ordered to be paid by April 29, 1994. Although Bender's liability 
has been conclusively determined, there remains a question with regard to the amount of 
Bender's liability on the sanction imposed for the expenses caused by her failure to 
comply with the court's discovery order because that sanction has not yet been quantified.  
The court order stated that "defendant Brown and attorney Bender, jointly and severally, 
are DIRECTED TO PAY to the Clerk of Court the reasonable travel expenses and standard 
hourly fees incurred by plaintiffs for the services of Mr. John Welsch, MAI, to the extent 
he was unable to inspect defendants' properties, within 14 days of the filing by 
plaintiffs of a verified statement itemizing said expenses and fees."  App. at 653.  
Martin never filed a verified statement with the district court.  Thus, the amount of this 
sanction remains unquantified. 
 Generally, an order is not final until it is reduced to a determinate amount.  
Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, Employees or Officers
1080, 1089 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 27 F.3d 931, 
934-35 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Sleight, 808 F.2d 1012, 1015 (3d Cir. 1987); 
Becton Dickinson & Co. v. District 65, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implemen
Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 799 F.2d 57, 61-62 (3d Cir. 1986).  The need for quantification 
arises from "concerns with duplicative expenditure of judicial time and resources."  
Sleight, 808 F.2d at 1015.  It is not without exceptions, however.  See, e.g.
Seidman, 37 F.3d 911 (3d Cir. 1994).  One exception applies to orders in which the amount, 
when determined, is insignificant in the overall context of the dispute and itself 
unlikely to be the subject of a later appeal.  Thus, we recently stated in 
[W]e have continued to recognize that an order is final even if it 
does not reduce the damages to a sum certain if "the order 
sufficiently disposes of the factual and legal issues and [if] any 
14 
unresolved issues are sufficiently 'ministerial' that there would be 
no likelihood of further appeal." 
 
 
Apex, 27 F.3d at 936 (quoting Polychrome Int'l Corp. v. Krigger, 5 F.3d 1522, 1544 n.52 
(3d Cir. 1993)) (second alteration in original). 
 In this case, the sole discovery expense Martin incurred was the cost of
retaining a single real estate appraiser to inspect the property.  The determination of 
this amount is likely to be straightforward and mechanical, and it is also unlikely to 
result in a later appeal.  Furthermore, Bender insists her concern is not the mo
her professional reputation.  In Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 1994), we 
recognized that the impact of attorney sanctions goes beyond the dollar amount and acts 
"as a symbolic statement about the quality and integrity of an attorney's work
statement which may have tangible effect upon the attorney's career."  In the overall 
context of this case, the dollar amounts of the sanctions imposed and the potential 
liability for the unquantified sanction are insignificant in comparison to 
effect.  Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to explain Martin's delay in filing 
the statement and it now appears highly unlikely that it will ever be filed.  Though the 
record leaves much to be desired, the district court's order limited Martin to recovery of 
whatever amount is due from, or paid by Martin to Welsch for the time Welsch lost on a day 
on which he showed up to inspect Brown's real estate and was not able to do so.  
at 249-255.  Because the only thing missing is an invoice from the appraiser covering this 
limited lost time, we believe quantification is essentially a ministerial or 
"mathematical" calculation that can be based on Welsch's bill for this time.  Thus, this 
case is distinguishable from those in which we have refused to entertain appeals from 
unquantified orders holding attorneys liable for reasonable attorney's fees over the 
course of a particular dispute.  See In re Jeannette Corp., 832 F.2d 43, 45 (3d Cir. 
15 
1987).  We conclude that the district court's orders conclusively determine the sanctions 
question. 
 
2.  The "Importance/Separateness" Prong 
 Turning to whether the matter is separate from the merits of the action, it has 
been said that this prong "means that review now is less likely to force the ap
court to consider approximately the same (or a very similar) matter more than once, and 
also seems less likely to delay trial court proceedings (for, if the matter is truly 
collateral, those proceedings might continue while the appeal is pending)."
WL 347244, at *4.  This requirement of separateness "derives from the principle that there 
should not be piecemeal review of steps toward final judgment in which they will merge." 
Praxis Properties, 947 F.2d at 56-57 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Attorney 
sanctions, especially discovery sanctions, are, however, often too intertwined with the 
merits of the underlying litigation to permit immediate review under the collateral order 
doctrine.  See Eavenson, 775 F.2d at 538 n.6; Eastern Maico, 658 F.2d at 947.
 Thus, in Eastern Maico, we stated that "sanctions for violation of discovery 
orders are usually considered interlocutory and not immediately appealable."  
Maico, 658 F.2d at 947 (citations omitted).  In applying the separateness prong, we 
concluded, "[i]n order to address the question whether the documents requested by 
plaintiffs were truly relevant, we would have to consider the charges against the 
defendants and reach some conclusion as to the relative importance of the disc
material."  Id.  Thus, we held that "the discovery activity at issue here is not 
completely collateral to the underlying action."  Id. 
 The circumstances of Eastern Maico, however, differ significantly from those 
before us in Bender's case.  In Eastern Maico, the party challenging the sanction issue 
agreed that the sanction order could not "be adequately understood without examination of 
the entire discovery history in the case," which "would inevitably enmesh us in questions 
16 
of relevance which could not be decided without reference to the underlying dispute."  
at 951.  In contrast, in Bender's case we can review the district court's alleged failure 
to comply with the mandates of procedural due process.  This review will not "enmesh" us 
in the merits of the underlying litigation. 
 Here, as in Eavenson, there is little danger that our review will cause delay.  
Brown is in bankruptcy, Martin's case against him has been dismissed and Bender does not 
represent Brown in the bankruptcy.  To the best of our knowledge, the underlying 
litigation continues in the bankruptcy court.  Thus, Bender's sanction is "collateral to 
and separate from the merits not only because the principal case cannot be affected by the 
outcome of the sanction appeal, but also because the sanction appeal cannot be affected by 
the outcome of the principal case." Lawrence R. Kemm, supra, 25 Ind. L. Rev. at 924.  
Thus, we conclude that the sanctions imposed against Bender are separate from the 
underlying merits within the meaning of Cohen.0 
 This prong, however, contains two subparts.  The claim on appeal must be one 
that is "too important to be denied review."  Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.  Therefore, we must 
also consider whether the issue Bender poses is important.  This question is sometim
merged in discussion with the third prong of the Cohen doctrine because the adequacy of 
subsequent review affects the importance of the question.  See Digital Equipment
S. Ct. at 2001 (applying the importance requirement as part of the third prong,
that other cases have properly applied it to the second prong, citing Coopers & Lybrand
437 U.S. at 468; Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498 (1989)).  Whether 
importance is reviewed as part of the second or the third prong, however, it "simply 
cannot be answered without a judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost 
through rigorous application of a final judgment requirement." Id.  As noted above, the 
                     
0Our finding of separateness is dependent on the facts presently before us.  As in 
Eavenson, "[w]e do not now adopt a rule that would allow immediate appellate review of 
sanction order imposed upon counsel, whether counsel has withdrawn from the case or not."  
Eavenson, 775 F.2d at 539 (emphasis in original). 
17 
imposition of attorney sanctions may impose significant burdens on the reputation and 
career opportunities of the sanctioned attorney.  We believe such potential harm, absent 
compliance with the constitutional protections of due process, coupled with the lack of 
later opportunity for effective appellate review, is sufficient to meet the importance 
requirement of the collateral order doctrine.  See Digital Equipment, 114 S.
("Where statutory and constitutional rights are concerned, irretrievable loss can hardly 
be trivial . . . .") (internal quotations and brackets omitted). 
 
3.  The "Unreviewability" Prong 
 On the unreviewability prong of the Cohen requirements, we consider whether the 
district court's orders will be "effectively unreviewable" if we do not review them now. 
Bertoli, 994 F.2d at 1012.  To meet this requirement, "an order must be such that review 
postponed will, in effect, be review denied."  Id. (internal quotation marks and ellipses 
omitted). For purposes of the collateral order doctrine, unreviewability "means that 
failure to review immediately may well cause significant harm."  Johnson, 1995 WL 347244 
at *4 (citing 15A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 3911, pp. 334-35 (1992)). 
 In Eastern Maico, we concluded that we lacked appellate jurisdiction under the 
collateral doctrine, in part, because the attorney was unable to satisfy the third 
requirement.  We held that the orders would "be fully reviewable on appeal from final 
judgment:  the parties to the order will still be before the court, and retain the same 
interest in challenging the order as they have today."  Eastern Maico, 658 F.2d. at 947.  
As Bender is no longer involved in the underlying case, Eastern Maico is not analogous.  
In this regard, Bender is in a situation more similar to the attorney sanctione
Eavenson.  There, we stated: 
Because appellant [] is no longer connected with the merits of the 
case, he has an immediate interest in challenging the sanction which 
is not shared by the parties to the suit or by counsel to a party.
18 
 
 
Eavenson, 775 F.2d at 538-39.  Bender, like the attorney in Eavenson and again unlike the 
attorney in Eastern Maico, is no longer a participant in the proceedings.  Therefore, 
Bender is unlikely to have an adequate and effective opportunity for review if we do not 
consider her appeal of the sanctions imposed on her now. 
 In sum, we hold that the sanction orders against Bender "conclusively determine 
the disputed question," "resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of 
the action," and are "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."  
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988) (citations 
omitted).  Thus, we have appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine's 
flexible concept of finality.  Accordingly, we will now turn to the merits of Bender's 
appeal. 
 
IV.  Standard of Review 
 We review orders imposing sanctions for abuse of discretion.  See
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991); Arab African Int'l Bank v. Epstein, 10 F.3d 168, 171 
(3d Cir. 1993).  When the procedure the district court uses in imposing sanctions raises 
due process issues of fair notice and the right to be heard, however, our review is 
plenary.  See Fabulous Assoc., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
780, 783 (3d Cir. 1990) (constitutional issues subject to plenary review); 
Inc. v. Hedco, Inc., 838 F.2d 718, 725 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Gillette Foods, Inc. v. 
Bayernwald-Fruchteverwertung, GmbH, 977 F.2d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 1992) (applyi
review to legal issues that arise in a sanctions context). 
 
V.  Discussion 
A. 
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 Bender contends that the district court denied her notice and an opportunity to 
be heard when it sanctioned her for failure to comply with discovery.  The Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires a federal court to provide notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before sanctions are imposed on a litigant or attorney.
Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 570-71 (3d Cir. 1985) (in banc); Landon v. Hunt
F.2d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 
 No precise all encompassing rule captures the requirements of procedural due 
process.  The process that is due varies with the nature of particular disputes, and 
evaluation of its requirements should balance fairly the competing interests of the 
sanctioned person against the judicial system's need for efficient judicial 
administration.  See Corino, 27 F.3d at 64 ("The precise form of procedural protection 
required will, of course, vary with the circumstances of the case."); Eash, 757 F.2d at 
570 ("The form which those procedural protections must take is determined by an evaluation 
of all the circumstances and an accommodation of competing interests.").  Nevertheless, 
the fundamental requirements of due process--notice and an opportunity to respond
afforded before any sanction is imposed.  See Eash, 757 F.2d at 570 (citation omitted); 
Jones v. Pittsburgh National Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1357 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 
F.2d at 570-71).  With regard to sanctions, particularized notice of the grounds for the 
sanction under consideration is generally required.  See, e.g., Corino, 27 F.3d at 64; 
Jones, 899 F.2d at 1357.0 
                     
0Because we conclude that the district court failed to afford Bender procedural due 
process, we believe it is unnecessary and inappropriate for us to decide on this record 
her contention that she engaged in no sanctionable misconduct.  We believe the district 
court must first address these matters on remand, after Bender is afforded the procedural 
safeguards required by the Due Process Clause. 
0Recently, we upheld the imposition of sanctions under the bankruptcy court's inherent 
sanction power without requiring this type of "particularized notice."  Fellheimer, Eichen 
& Braverman, P.C. v. Charter Technologies, Inc., No. 94-3461, 1995 WL 369875 (3d Cir. 
June 22, 1995).  In that case, however, the sanctioned attorney was plainly on notice tha
he was facing sanctions for conduct involving subjective bad faith. 
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 Bender's due process argument has two prongs.  She argues that the district 
court failed to give her sufficient prior notice of the possibility of sanctions and also 
failed to relate specifically her conduct to the various theories it used to justify the 
sanctions.  She contends that the court required her to defend her actions under ever
weapon the judicial arsenal has available for imposing sanctions on an attorney.
 Bender's argument that the district court wholly failed to provide her notice is 
somewhat overstated.  In its memorandum, the district court stated that the sanctions it 
imposed on Bender for failure to afford discovery were imposed under Rule 37.
motion requesting Rule 37 sanctions for noncompliance with the court's discovery order 
obviously referred to Rule 37. It was served on Bender and she filed a response.  T
district court also provided her sufficient opportunity to be heard.  It held a hearing 
before deciding the issues Martin's Rule 37 motion raised.  Bender's election to rely on 
local counsel to state her position because of her own prior commitment is i
Although Martin's motion only requested dismissal or preclusion of evidence, Bender had 
fair notice and an adequate opportunity to respond to Martin's request for Rule
sanctions before their imposition.  See Corino, 27 F.3d at 64. 
 Bender's argument, however, that the district court's order imposing the 
sanctions was overly broad, is more troubling. Rule 37 cannot justify the $500 sanction 
                     
0In this respect, the district court said: 
 
1. Plaintiff's Revised Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 37 
(Document No. 434) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as follows:  
. . . c) plaintiff's request to sanction defendants and/or their 
counsel for refusal to permit meaningful inspection of real property 
in compliance with this court's orders of December 30, 1992 and 
January 25, 1993, is GRANTED, and defendant Harold E. Brown and 
attorney Rebecca E. Bender are DIRECTED TO PAY to the Clerk of [the] 
Court the sum of $500.00 EACH for their willful refusal to comply with 
the court's orders; [and they are both jointly and severally liable 
for the resulting costs to the plaintiff]. 
 
App. at 651-53.   
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the district court imposed on Bender for her refusal to allow discovery.0  Absent 
contempt, the only monetary sanctions Rule 37 authorizes are "reasonable expenses" 
resulting from the failure to comply with discovery.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (1995); 
Newton v. A.C.&S., Inc., 918 F.2d 1121, 1126 (3d Cir. 1990).0  The district court failed 
to explain the basis for the sanction amount.  Although the imposition of the related 
discovery costs are allowable under Rule 37, imposition of the unauthorized fine leaves 
the court's justification for these sanctions ambiguous and thus requires us to look 
elsewhere in the court's opinion to determine the grounds for both these discovery 
sanctions and the refiling sanction. The only other reference to the grounds for sanctions 
is made in the district court's introduction.  There, the district court states without 
elaboration that it imposed sanctions under Rule 11, Rule 37, 28 U.S.C.A. §
inherent powers.0 
                     
0Although Rule 37 authorizes both punitive and compensatory damages, it requires the 
amount of any monetary damages to be specifically related to expenses incurred by the 
violations.  See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1980); 
Ford Motor Co., 636 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The principal purpose of Rule
is punitive, not compensatory.").  But see Media Duplication Services, Inc. v. HDG 
Software, 928 F.2d 1228, 1241-1242 (1st Cir. 1991).  The sanctions in Newton v. A.C.&S., 
Inc., 918 F.2d 1121 (3d Cir. 1990), and Media Duplication were imposed under Rule 16(f), 
not Rule 37(b)(2).  The latter is directed to a party or its agents. Rule 16(f) refers 
expressly to "a party or [its] attorney." 
0Rule 37(b)(2) states in part: 
 
the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the 
attorney advising that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses, 
including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court 
finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (1995). 
0We reproduce the full text of the relevant portion of April 20 and April 25 orders: 
 
Penalties will now be imposed for the continued shenanigans of the 
parties and their counsel, who have been repeatedly warned that the 
court would take such action under the authority of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, especially F.R.C.P. Rules 11 and 37, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927, and its inherent power to correct abuses of the judicial 
process. 
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 This scatter-gun approach is unfair to Bender.  It also makes our task of 
deciding whether the district court acted consistently with a sound exercise of discret
impossible on the record now before us.  Jones, 899 F.2d at 1358; accord Foster v. Mydas 
Associates, Inc., 943 F.2d 139, 141-42 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Int'l Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338, 1346 (2d Cir. 1991).  In Jones, supra, we addressed a similar 
problem and held: 
 Because the district court did not differentiate between Rule
and [section 1927] in imposing sanctions, we are not in a position 
even to know whether the district court applied the correct standard 
insofar as Rule 11 is concerned.  In consequence, the entire order 
imposing sanctions on appellant must be vacated. 
 
 
899 F.2d at 1358.  The district court's failure to relate its general grounds to Bender's 
conduct (and her conduct alone) requires us to vacate its order sanctioning her and to 
remand this case for further proceedings in which the district court will have an 
opportunity to elaborate on Bender's conduct, as well as her state of mind, and identify 
the legal basis for each sanction imposed against Bender. 
 
B. 
 Though we will not decide any of the other issues Bender raises, we think it may 
be appropriate to comment briefly on some issues that are likely to come up on the remand.  
Rule 11 authorizes imposition of sanctions upon the signer of any pleading, motion 
other paper that was presented for an improper purpose, e.g., "to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."  See Landon
at 452.  Rule 11 sanctions are based on "'an objective standard of reasonablene
the circumstances.'"  Id. at 453 n.3 (quoting Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle
90, 94 (3d Cir. 1988)).  Bad faith is not required.  Id.; Jones, 899 F.2d at 1358.  
Rule 11(c)(1) provides that sanctions can be initiated either by motion or on the court's 
                                                                  
App. at 651. 
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initiative.  When acting on its own initiative, however, the district court should first 
enter an order describing the specific conduct that it believes will warrant sanctions and 
direct the person it seeks to sanction to show cause why particular sanctions should not 
be imposed.  See Rule 11(c)(1)(B); see also Rule 11(c)(3) ("When imposing sanctions, the 
court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and 
explain the basis for the sanction imposed.").  If the district court wishes to sanction 
Bender under Rule 11, it should issue and serve on her an order to show cause and, after 
considering any response she may file, explain its rationale and describe the specific 
conduct that supports the particular Rule 11 sanction imposed.0 
 Likewise, if the court desires to base any sanction on section 1927
refer to that statute in the order to show cause and relate specific conduct to its 
violation.   We note, however, that section 1927, unlike Rule 11, requires bad faith.  
Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987). In addition, section
Rule 37, authorizes only the imposition of costs and expenses that result from the 
particular misconduct the court sanctions.  Eash, 757 F.2d at 560.  Section 1927 also 
limits these costs and expenses to those that could be taxed to a losing party under 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1920 (West 1994). Id. 
                     
0Rule 11 also has specific notice requirements echoing the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  See Corino, 27 F.3d at 64 ("The party sought to be sanctioned is entitled to 
particularized notice including, at a minimum, 1) the fact that Rule 11 sanctions are 
under consideration, 2) the reasons why sanctions are under consideration, and 3) the form 
of sanctions under consideration."). 
0Section 1927 states: 
 
 Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any 
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies 
the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be 
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, 
expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such 
conduct. 
 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1927. 
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 Usually, the inherent power that a district court retains to sanction attorneys 
also requires bad faith.  Gillette Foods, 977 F.2d at 813 ("[A] court may assess 
attorney's fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons.") (internal quotations omitted); Landon, 938 F.2d at 454 ("[A] 
prerequisite for the exercise of the district court's inherent power to sanction is a 
finding of bad faith conduct."); but see Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric 
Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 74 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994) (sanctions imposed under the court's inherent 
authority do not always require a showing of bad faith).0  We have previously suggested 
care in the use of inherent powers to impose sanctions.  See Fellheimer, Eichert, 
Braverman, 1995 WL 369875, at *8 ("'Because of their very potency,' . . . the federal 
courts must be careful to exercise their inherent powers 'with restraint and 
discretion.'") (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44); Republic of Philippines, 43 F.3d at 74.  
Generally, a court's inherent power should be reserved for those cases in which the 
conduct of a party or an attorney is egregious and no other basis for sanctions exists.  
See Gillette Foods, 977 F.2d at 813. 
 In summary, if the district court on remand wishes to pursue sanctions against 
Bender, it should do more than state generally the various grounds authorizing them.  
should relate each sanction to some aspect of Bender's conduct and explain how that 
conduct comes within the authority it relies on to impose it.   Any sanctions imposed 
against Bender should also be imposed solely because of her own improper conduct wi
considering the conduct of the parties or any other attorney. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
                     
0Bender correctly points out that the district court never used the term bad faith in its 
order and suggests that there is no evidence that could support a finding of bad faith.  
The district court on remand will be in a position to determine, in the first instance, 
whether Bender acted in bad faith. 
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 For the reasons stated above, we will vacate the district court's orders of 
April 20 and April 25, 1994 insofar as they impose sanctions on Bender for refusing 
discovery and for refiling motions addressing issues already decided.  The case will be 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
Bender shall bear her own costs. 
 
                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEON M. MARTIN v. HAROLD ED BROWN, ET AL. 
No. 94-3248                              
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 I respectfully dissent because I believe we are without appellate jurisdiction.
 The court correctly concludes that the district court's order hav
of staying this case pending resolution of the bankruptcy proceeding is not a final order.  
It also correctly concludes that an attorney who no longer represents a party may under 
some circumstances appeal a sanction order under the collateral order doctrine.  However, 
I believe it errs in concluding that the order here appealed from meets the 
"conclusiveness" prong of the collateral order doctrine. 
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 The first of the two provisions of the order imposing sanctions on Bender 
provides as follows: 
 [P]laintiff's request to sanction defendants and/or their counsel 
for refusal to permit meaningful inspection of real property in 
compliance with this court's orders of December 30, 1992 and January 
25, 1993, is GRANTED, and defendant Harold E. Brown and attorney 
Rebecca E. Bender are DIRECTED TO PAY to the Clerk of Court the sum of 
$500.00 EACH for their willful refusal to comply with the court's 
orders; additionally defendant Brown and attorney Bender, jointly and 
severally, are DIRECTED TO PAY to the Clerk of Court the reasonable 
travel expenses and standard hourly fees incurred by plaintiffs for 
the services of Mr. John Welsch, MAI, to the extent he was unable to 
inspect defendants' properties, within 14 days of the filing by 
plaintiffs of a verified statement itemizing said expenses and fees . 
. . . 
App. at 659-60. 
 The court acknowledges that "the amount of this sanction remains unquantified" 
and that, generally, "an order is not final until it is reduced to a determinate amount" 
(Slip op. at 17).  It relies, however, on a venerable exception to the general rule known 
as the Forgay-Conrad doctrine, see Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848),
is applicable to cases in which the order appealed from leaves nothing to do but a 
"ministerial act."  The court cites Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 27 F.3d 931 
(3d Cir. 1994) as authority for its conclusion that this is such a case. 
 In Apex, this court held that an order establishing liability and ordering an 
accounting, but not quantifying the amount of money to be paid the plaintiff by the 
defendant, was not a final order.  We made clear that the word "ministerial" in the 
context of the Forgay-Conrad doctrine refers to "mechanical" acts, like mathematical 
calculations, about which there can be no dispute.  Only when the act remaining to be done 
is "ministerial" in this sense can an appellate court proceed with assurance that there 
                     
0
  In the Forgay case itself, the order appealed from directed the immediate transfer of 
physical property to the plaintiff, as well as an accounting.  The losing par
regarded as facing immediate irreparable injury and this fact has been regarded by 
numerous courts as essential to the result reached.  See 9 James W. Moore et al., 
Federal Practice ¶110.11, at 89-97 (2d ed. 1995).  
 
3 
will "be no likelihood of [a] further appeal."  Apex, 27 F.3d at 936 (quotation omitted).  
We stressed the importance of the considerations behind insisting on quantification of 
damages, quoting from the Supreme Court's decision in Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard
517 (1988): 
"Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the 
district judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in 
our judicial system.  In addition, the [finality] rule is in 
accordance with the sensible policy of avoiding the obstruction to 
just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of 
a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a 
litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment."  
Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 521-22 n.3, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 
1949 n. 3, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988) (quotations omitted); see Catlin v. 
United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633-34, 89 L.Ed. 
911 (1945)("The foundation of this policy is not in merely technical 
conceptions of 'finality.'  It is one against piecemeal litigation.").
 
Apex, 27 F.3d at 935 (alteration in original). 
 Most important for present purposes, we noted in Apex that this understanding of 
the importance of finality is "reflected in our cases holding that a district court order 
awarding 'reasonable' attorneys fees is not appealable until the fees are quantified in 
order to prevent two appeals -- one on whether attorneys fees should be awarded and a 
second on the amount of the award."  Id.  In my view, a determination of "reasonable 
travel expenses" and reasonable0 fees for the expert services of a professional "to the 
extent he was unable to inspect defendants' properties" holds no less potential for 
disagreement and a second appeal than does the typical determination of the amount of 
reasonable litigation expense and reasonable counsel fees following an unquantified award 
of such expenses and fees.  Accordingly, I do not see how we can hear this appeal without 
hereafter also hearing appeals from unquantified counsel fee awards.   
                     
0
  While the district court's order refers to "standard hourly fees" rather than 
"reasonable fees," the former is obviously intended as an indicia of the latter and does 
not suggest to me that the potential for disagreement is less than that inherent in a 
lodestar determination. 
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 My concern about the court's ruling on jurisdiction is based only in part on the 
considerations we stressed in Apex. Piecemeal appellate review is an inefficiency the 
federal judiciary can ill afford.  But today's ruling gives rise to a distinct, equally 
grave, concern.  An order is either final or it is not final and if it is final, there is 
but a limited period in which courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review it.  This 
makes it crucial that a party and its counsel be able to know with certainty when an order 
is final.  In the absence of such certainty, counsel must either flood us with protective 
appeals or run the risk that appeal rights will be unintentionally foregone.
ministerial exception is extended beyond the realm of mathematic calculations, uncertainty 
will necessarily be generated in an area where certainty is essential to the efficient 
operation of the appellate justice system.    
 I would insist that the amount of the sanctions assessed against Ms. Bender be 
established before she is permitted to seek appellate review of those sanctions.
nothing to be lost by so requiring and a great deal to be gained. 
                     
0
  See 9 Moore et al., supra note 1, ¶ 110.11, at 98-99.   
0
  The court considers it significant that Martin has apparently not yet applied to have 
the sanction quantified and may not do so hereafter.  Ms. Bender, however, is free to 
apply to the court for an order requiring quantification or the deletion of the portion of 
the order relating to Martin's expenses. 
     Nor am I persuaded by the court's suggestion that the district court's order is 
appealable because it constitutes "a symbiotic statement about the quality and integrity 
of" Ms. Bender's work.  We rejected such a suggestion in Eastern Maico Distributors, Inc. 
v. Maico-Fahrzeugfabrik, G.m.b.H., 658 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1981).   
 
